Interdisciplinary collaboration in the field of psychology of reasoning

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.56294/piii2024291

Keywords:

reasoning, probability, paradigma

Abstract

In the psychology of reasoning there is the emergence of a new paradigm that moves away from the previous project that attempted to understand human reasoning through its alignment with classical logic. The new paradigm has replaced logic with Bayesian probability theory, and phenomena such as argumentation, deduction and induction are modeled within a probabilistic social framework.
This new paradigm appears to be more conducive to interdisciplinary collaboration, as well as more in need of such an approach. The possible link with explanations of rationality in psychology, philosophy, neuroscience and artificial intelligence seems more fruitful than in the previous paradigm. The emphasis on probability theory is linked to the explosion of interest in Bayesian models of perception, motor control, language processing and knowledge representation in psychology. There are also strong connections with Bayesian brain theory. The emphasis on knowledge-rich reasoning embedded in social interactions links to inferential theories of communication. In addition, the focus on cognitive division of labor links to developments in social epistemology and explanations of the collective rationality of simple agents with finance theory, economics, and theories of cumulative cultural evolution.
In this framework, the present paper aims to review the current conditions of cooperation in the field of the psychology of reasoning, as well as its possibilities and limits for the future

References

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Published

2024-05-08

How to Cite

1.
Blanco JF. Interdisciplinary collaboration in the field of psychology of reasoning. SCT Proceedings in Interdisciplinary Insights and Innovations [Internet]. 2024 May 8 [cited 2024 Oct. 7];2:291. Available from: https://proceedings.ageditor.ar/index.php/piii/article/view/260